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ABSTRACT 
 
Uranium mines are the - often forgotten - source of nuclear power. The promotion of 
nuclear energy as a clean alternative and the projected increase of electricity demand in 
countries such as China and India, have led to a global “uranium rush”, unseen since the 
peak of the Cold War. This article studies the formation of the expanding nuclear 
frontier looking at the interaction between the global uranium metabolism, industrial 
dynamics and local ecologies of resistance using Namibia as a case-study. Namibia, the 
world´s fourth largest producer of uranium, stands at the frontier of this rush with sixty-
six recently granted prospecting licenses that could turn into mines, compared to only 
three currently operating mines. We focus on three generic attributes that help to 
explain the emergence and intensity of resistance by local communities to uranium 
mining: the ecology and geography of the resource; the degree and type of political and 
economic marginalization of the community; and crucially, the connection and 
integration of local concerns with broader social movements and political demands. We 
show with the use of empirical material how these factors play out differently in five 
Namibian communities that have been, or stand to be, affected by uranium mining, and 
explain how local ecologies of resistance shape the global uranium rush.  
 
Keywords: Uranium; nuclear power; mining; social movements; Africa. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In April 2011, the PEW and other U.S. environmental groups denounced the threat for 
America‟s most important natural heritage sites from the pending decision by the 
Obama administration on whether to extend the two-year respite on the thousands of 
mining claims, many in search of uranium, surrounding the Grand Canyon, Mount 
Rushmore, Joshua Tree and the Yosemite national parks. More than 2,900 claims wait 
in Grand Canyon alone (PEW, 2011). One year earlier in the town of Arlit in the Sahara 
desert of Niger, seven employees of the French construction company Vinci and the 
French nuclear energy firm Areva were kidnapped by Al-Qaida (BBC, 16 September 
2010) leading to a temporary stop of construction in the mega uranium mine at 
Imouraren. An anxious  Minister of Mines and Energy assured the international 
community that Niger will "maintain output and not be discouraged by these dramatic 
events" (The Guardian, 15 October 2010). What connects such disparate events in 
distant - geographically and socio-economically - parts of the world is the emergent 
global “uranium rush” (MME, 2010; PEW,2011). This is the subject of this article.  
 
Uranium mining is the forgotten first step in the production chain of nuclear power. Its 
effects on health and biodiversity are not as grave as those of leakage from a failed 
nuclear reactor, but they too can be dramatic (Brugge, 2005; IEER, 2006; ECRR, 2003, 
Kuletz, 1998). Given the low concentration of uranium in natural ore, considerable 
quantities of residues are produced during extraction and processing, including heavy 
metals and radioactive decayed elements. Such residues, contained in ponds or dams 
nearby the mill, can leach to underground and surface water sources. Or worse they can 
escape to the environment if dams break, as it happened in New Mexico in 1979 when 
over 1,000tn of radioactive mill waste were released into the Puerco River, a radiation 
release greater than the Three Mile Island disaster (Kuletz, 1998). Most of the radiation 
emitted typically in a mining site is considered „low level radiation‟ (<100mSv). 
Regarded as harmless or even beneficial by some scientists (Sanders, 2009), others such 
as the International Commission for Radiological Protection (ICRP), which sets the 
radiological limits adopted by the International Atomic energy agency (IAEA) contends 
that “it is scientifically plausible to assume that the incidence of cancer or hereditary 
disorders will rise in direct proportion to an increase in the equivalent dose in the 
relevant organs and tissues, below about 100 mSv” (Wrixon, 2008). And the National 
Research Council in the US (IEER, 2007) reminds that while low doses may mean less 
cancers, “it is unlikely that there is a threshold below which cancers are not induced”. 
External radiation (alpha, beta and gamma) as well as internal radiation received 
through radon gas, dust and water constitute major hazards in uranium mines. Many 
epidemiological studies have been carried out, among others for the Navajo population 
in the U.S. and ex-workers of the Wismut mine in Germany that operated until 1990 and 
demonstrate links between exposure and high levels of diseases such as bronchial and 
lung cancer (see among others, Gilliland et al., 2000 and studies by the Southwest 
Research Information Centre for the US and Kreuzer et al., 2011 for Germany).  
 
Social reaction and stricter environmental regulation of uranium mining in countries 
such as Australia or the U.S., has shifted mining activities to poorer countries with less 
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restrictive legislation (Otto, 1998; Campbell, 2009; MMSD, 2002). In the context of a 
pre-Fukushima global “boom” in uranium prospecting driven by the emergence of 
nuclear power as the energy option of choice, Africa quickly became a global uranium 
frontier (Financial Times, 1 May 2009, OECD,2009). Namibia is the world´s fourth 
largest producer of uranium, accounting for 9% of global supply and about 5% of 
estimated global reserves (WNA 2010; 2011b). Since 2005, 66 exploration licenses 
have been granted and 5 new mines are in the process of opening (MME, 2010). The 
purpose of this article is to understand how global patterns and local – natural and social 
– ecologies combine to shape the expansion of the uranium frontier, learning from the 
concrete empirical reality of Namibia. Our aim is analytical; leaving aside the normative 
question of whether, or under what conditions, uranium mining may be desirable or 
damaging, we focus on explaining a contemporary socio-environmental phenomenon, 
i.e. uranium rush, and the territorial forms it takes.   
  
Our research is positioned within a growing literature at the interface of ecological 
economics and political ecology, concerned with the expansion of the global social 
metabolism of material and energy flows and the impacts and reactions this creates in 
territories and communities at so-called extraction, or “commodity frontiers” (Moore, 
2010). Particular attention has been paid on the emergence and role of social-
environmental movements that defend local livelihood against far-destined exploitation 
(Martinez-Alier, 2003). Unlike the sociology of social movements, which aims to 
explain the factors determining successful collective action, political ecology focuses on 
the interplay between social and environmental conditions at multiple scales and how 
this results in different forms of livelihood environmentalism (Urkidi, 2010; Gerber, 
2011).  
 
Movements, markets, corporations and governments co-shape the territory. Social 
resistance cannot be taken for granted, and in many cases, including Namibia, reaction 
is conspicuously absent. Understanding when, why and how resistance emerges is 
crucial for envisaging the shape and implications of commodity frontiers. Drawing from 
political ecology, we use three entry-points to explain resistance (see also Bebbington et 
al., 2008). The first concerns the particular “spatial ecology” of the mining resource at 
stake and the surrounding human and livelihood resource landscape. This includes 
factors such as the form and nature of impacts (visible vs. non-visible, immediate vs. 
slow-onset, future risk vs. acute health impact) and the location of the mine with respect 
to settlements and alternative livelihood resource uses that may be affected by mining 
activities. We hypothesize that the more direct, visible and immediate the impacts on 
health or livelihoods are, the more likely mobilization is. The second category concerns 
the marginalization of the community affected and its relationship with the territory 
(Robbins, 2004). On the one extreme one finds politically disenfranchised communities 
that are „too poor to be green‟ (Guha and Martinez Alier, 1997) and on the other, strong, 
politically organized communities with broader historical-political demands. 
Attachment to the place and the existence of a material or symbolic economy relying on 
local resources are important variables in this respect. The third category concerns 
connections between locals and historical or extra-local social movements. National or 
international NGOs play an important role in bringing knowledge to the local level, 
making connections to movements elsewhere, mobilizing extra-local resources for local 
action, and acting at different scales of the metabolism (Urkidi, 2010; Escobar, 2001).  
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We use five case-studies of mining projects in Namibia to enrich understandings of how 
different communities respond to uranium mining; we do not seek generalised 
causation, but in-depth understanding. The communities examined represent the 
different socio-economic and historical uranium mining landscapes that are emerging in 
Namibia. This research has been developed in a period of two years, including 
participation in meetings, discussion lists, exchange of information with NGOs and 
other researchers. The main part of empirical research was carried out during three 
months of field stay in Namibia (May-July 2009). Conde Puigmal visited the capital 
Windhoek, and the communities analysed in this article conducting 155 semi structured 
interviews and 2 informal focus groups with different stakeholders such as mine and 
government representatives, union members, consultants to the mining industry and 
journalists. Interviews with policy makers and corporations discussed the regulatory 
framework, the monitoring of impacts and technical aspects of mining planning and 
regulation. Interviews and focus groups with individuals and workers from the affected 
communities focused on livelihoods, perceptions and knowledge of the mining industry 
and reactions. Some interviewees wish to remain anonymous so interviews have been 
numbered for reference. Email contact has been maintained since with several members 
of NGOs, mining industry, journalists and government representatives for subsequent 
research questions. 
  
Section 2 analyses the changing and growing global uranium metabolism, focussing on 
production, consumption and market patterns and explaining how these interact with 
socio-regulatory forces that shift the frontier to Africa. Section 3 presents the empirical 
research. First, we explain the geographical and political-economic context of Namibia 
and the governance vacuum that is taken advantage by the uranium mining industry. 
Next, we document the history of the most emblematic uranium mining community in 
Namibia, developed by Rio Tinto at the end of the seventies and being to this day one of 
the world‟s largest uranium mines. Next, we move to the recent rush and analyse the 
plans for four new uranium mines in different geo-political settings, presenting the 
perceptions and reactions of the communities that stand to be affected. Section 4 pulls 
together the various threads, global and local, historical and contemporary, of this 
research to assess and theorise on the uranium frontier.  
 
2. The global metabolism of uranium  
 
2.1 The commodity chain  
 
The global metabolism of a material resource can be conceptualized in terms of a 
commodity chain starting with resource and extraction and ending up with consumption 
and disposal. U235, the isotope required for the production of a fission chain reaction, 
makes less than 1% of natural uranium (IAEA, 2009). The first step for obtaining U235 
is the mining of economically viable ores. Traditionally this has been done with either 
open-pits or under-ground mines. The ore extracted is crushed, ground and leached with 
sulphuric acid, undergoing a process of ion exchange before being dried at high 
temperatures to obtain yellow cake powder that is finally packed in steel drums. This 
process is generally done in a uranium mill. Uranium oxide (yellow cake) is then 
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transported via truck, trains and boats to a processing facility, where it is transformed 
into Uranium Hexafluoride and enriched to increase the proportion of U235 (generally 
from 0,71 to 3-4%). It is then turned into a hard ceramic oxide (UO2) for assembly into 
rods specifically designed for each type of reactor. The rest of the yellow cake, mostly 
U238 is considered depleted uranium, and can be used with reprocessed plutonium 
(extracted from nuclear waste) to produce MOX, which is an alternative nuclear fuel.  
Enrichment facilities are only found in 11 countries (Iran being the latest addition) as 
countries are discouraged from developing them to avoid nuclear military proliferation. 
Uranium fuel rods are then transported to the various nuclear power plants (WNA, 
2011a; IAEA, 2009). 
 
The consumption and production of a resource coevolve, regulated by market forces and 
propelled by capital flows and the actions of corporations and investors. For the 
remaining of this section we look in turn at the interdependent demand, production and 
market forces of the uranium chain.    
 
2.2 Demand patterns 
 
Figure1 shows the evolution of uranium consumption and the shift from military to 
civilian (electricity) uses. The global distribution of uranium consumption largely 
corresponds to nuclear energy production, with the US being the largest consumer with 
104 reactors, followed by France with 58 reactors and Japan with 54 reactors operating 
before the Fukushima events (WNA, 2011c). 
 
 
Figure 1. Production of uranium from uranium mines. Source: Klingbiel (2005) 
 
The uranium metabolism today is driven by an inexorably growing demand for 
electricity, expected to increase at an annual rate of 2.2% to 2035. Most of this demand 
is expected to come from Asian countries such as China and India (IEA, 2010). Rising 
electricity demands coupled with international commitments to mitigate carbon 
emissions and climate change have been taken up by the nuclear lobby, which has 
successfully remarketed nuclear energy as a „clean‟ alternative (Combs, 2010; 
M. Conde & G. Kallis. Stewart: The Global Uranium Rush and its Africa Frontier. Lessons from Namibia 
 8 
 
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
OECD/NEA, 2009; IEA, 2010). Nuclear energy is benefiting from the price rise, the 
possible “peak” of other energy sources such as oil and gas (OECD, 2009) and the geo-
political instability in Northern Africa and the Middle East. Prominent advisory groups 
such as the OECD and the International Energy Agency see nuclear energy (together 
with renewables) as an essential component of future energy portfolios (IEA 2010; 
OECD, 2009). In his 2010 State of the Union address President Obama called for “a 
new generation of safe, clean nuclear plants” (CRS, 2010), while many 
environmentalists, such as James Lovelock or Guardian journalist George Monbiot have 
joined the chorus.  
 
With 57 new reactors under construction and 210 more on order or planned (WNA, 
2011c) an estimated 44 countries intended before Fukushima to introduce new nuclear 
power networks or expand existing ones in the foreseeable future. The Nuclear Energy 
Agency (an OECD organ) predicted an increase by a factor of 1.5 to 3.8 by 2050 from 
441 units in operation today (OECD/NEA, 2008). The Fukushima events have altered 
the nuclear energy expansion, with Germany being the first country to halt construction 
of new nuclear plants. Other countries also encountering ageing reactor fleets such as 
the UK, US and even France could also meet civil opposition. However, financial 
difficulties and lengthy approval and construction processes are the main underlying 
causes deterring the renaissance in these countries (The Economist, 14 October 2010 & 
30 March 2011; Bradford, 2010). Russia, China, South Korea and India stand at the 
forefront of the „nuclear renaissance‟ (WNA, 2011c) and although the Fukushima event 
might slow down the rate of construction of new plants, their main focus will be on 
improved nuclear security. 
 
This nuclear renaissance translated in increased uranium exploration efforts which 
soared between 2003 and 2009, with 400 junior companies forming or changing their 
orientation to raise US$ 2 billion for uranium exploration (WNA, 2010). Global 
uranium consumption was predicted in 2010 to increase 33% by 2020 and 54% by 2030 
(MEG, 2010).  
 
2.3 Production 
 
Some 53,663 tons of uranium were produced globally in 2010 from uranium mines 
accounting for 78% of global consumption. Secondary sources such as civil stockpiles, 
decommissioned nuclear weapons, reprocessed natural and enriched uranium and re-
enriched depleted uranium tails, account for the remaining 22%. Kazakhstan is 
presently the leading producer of mined uranium (33%), followed by Canada (18%), 
Australia (11%) and Namibia (8%) (WNA, 2011b). Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
total mine production and reserves between different countries. Production is very 
concentrated: the largest 5 uranium mines in the world - McArthur River in Canada, 
Ranger and Olympic Dam in Australia, Rössing in Namibia and Kraznokamensk in 
Kazakhstan - account for 43% of world uranium production (WNA,2011b). Reserves 
are also concentrated, from the roughly 5.4M tU of identified resources  (those costing 
less than US$130/kgU to extract) in 2010, Australia, Kazakhstan and Canada hold 51% 
of reserves (OECD, 2009). 
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Russia
480300 (9%)
3,562 (7%)
Kazakhstan
651800 (12%)
17,803 (33%)
Canada
485300 (9%)
9783 (18%)
Australia
1673000 (31%)
5,900 (11%)
Malawi
15000 (0.3%)
670 (1%)
South Africa
295600 (5%)
583 (1%)
China
171400 (3%)
827 (2%)
Niger
272900 (5%)
4198 (8%)Brasil
278700 (5%)
148(0.3%)
USA
207400 (4%)
1660 (3%) Uzbekistan
114600 (2%)
827 (2%)
Country
Reserves 
(% total)
Production
(% total)
Ukraine
105000 (2%)
850 (2%)
Namibia
284200(5%)
4496 (8%)
India
80200 (1%)
400 (0.7%)
Jordan
111800 (2%)
-
 
Figure 2. Major uranium producers and major world reserves of uranium (cost of extraction at less than 
US$130/kgU). Source: WNA 2011b; OECD, 2009 
 
Countries such as Canada and Australia not only have more identified reserves than 
Africa, but also their resources are of a much better quality and economically less costly 
to extract. Uranium concentration in the ores generally varies between 0.1 to 0.5 per 
cent (IAEA, 2009), with high concentrations (average 1.1%) found in Canada at the rich 
Athabasca basin (Mudd and Diesendorf, 2008), compared with the lower range of 
concentrations as low as 0.01% ores found in Namibia‟s deposits (WNA, 2010). Such 
ores require the use of more water and energy (Mudd and Diesendorf, 2008) and the use 
of alternative techniques such as heap leaching, where sulphuric acid is sprayed over 
piled-up-crushed ore and the solution with uranium oxide is collected below. This 
allows a more economic extraction of uranium from lower grade ores (IAEA, 2005) 
however its environmental impact is bigger as the piles not only take up more land but 
also create a bigger hazard releasing dust, radon gas and leaching liquid seepage (wise 
uranium, 2010) . The method that is becoming most dominant is In Situ-Leaching (ISL), 
which injects sulphuric acid solutions into underground deposits to dissolve uranium, 
which is then pumped up and processed in the mill. This technique avoids the creation 
of open-pits, but there is a risk of contaminating groundwater (Mudd, 2001).  
 
There is a notable shift in investment in new mines from countries in the “developed” 
world, such as Australia and Canada, to Kazakhstan and Africa, despite the fact that the 
former hold the most of the high quality reserves (E&MJ, 2006, 2009; MEG, 2010, 
Combs, 2010; Financial Time 1 May 2009). Australia, which holds 23% of known 
recoverable uranium reserves followed since 1984 a “Three Mines only Policy”, in 
effect a moratorium on all new developments (Panter, 1991). Moratoria to uranium 
mining in Australia was accompanied by a strong anti-nuclear and aboriginal movement 
demanding land rights (Adamson, 1999). Although legislation in countries such as 
Canada or Australia is not necessarily prohibitive, environmental regulation and 
compliance is much tougher than in other parts of the world.  It is the combination with 
effective social resistance and lengthy legal challenges that can slow down considerably 
the opening of a mine, and make investments in Africa advantageous. As noted by John 
M. Conde & G. Kallis. Stewart: The Global Uranium Rush and its Africa Frontier. Lessons from Namibia 
 10 
 
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
Borshoff (head of a uranium mining company called Paladin Energy Ltd): “Australia 
and Canada have become overly sophisticated. (..) there has been a sort of 
overcompensation in terms of thinking about environmental issues, social issues, way 
beyond what is necessary to achieve good practice” (abc, 2 April 2006). As a result, 
several Australian mining companies such as Paladin have all their uranium production 
in places like Namibia and Malawi (OECD,2009; RCR,2011). Of the 31 mines that 
were planned to be opened
1
 from 2009 to 2012 only 5 where located in Australia, US 
and Canada (OECD, 2009). 34 countries in Africa have already handed exploration 
licenses (wise uranium, 2011) with Niger issuing more than 100 exploration permits in 
the last 2 years while Botswana issuing 138 (MME, 2010). During the period 2009–
2012, in Niger, Namibia, Malawi and South Africa, uranium production is expected to 
increase 118% (Kate and Wilde-Ramsing, 2011).  
 
2.4 Industry and the market 
 
The uranium mining industry is heavily concentrated, ten companies marketing in 2010 
87% of the world's uranium production. The French giant Areva, the Canadian Cameco, 
Anglo-Australian Rio Tinto, and KazAtomProm the Kazakhstan state company (WNA, 
2011b) are the main players in this „cartel-type‟ industry These corporate players are 
rooted in the major consuming countries (France, Russia, USA) or in developed 
countries such as Australia and Canada with considerable reserves who served much of 
the early demand (Amundson, 2002; Combs, 2010; OCDE, 2007). Some of these 
companies, are active in the whole uranium commodity chain, like Areva, the French 
state nuclear giant, and Rosatom from Russia who are major players in both mining, 
enrichment and nuclear plant construction and operation. 
 
While all mining commodities are susceptible to market fluctuations and concomitant 
booms and busts in production and investment, uranium has the exceptional feature of a 
very constrained range of uses and users. This makes it stable in the short-term, and 
extremely unstable in the longer-term. Unlike gold for example, whose prices depend 
on a variety of economic factors and the tastes of millions of people, or copper, which is 
used in a variety of industrial applications, uranium is basically used for two purposes, 
bombs (no longer) and power stations, both dependant on political circumstances and 
vulnerable to inherently unknown events, such as an armistice or a nuclear accident. It 
was the Three Mile Island accident in 1979 for example that led to the spectacular bust 
of the 1970s boom with the stop of commissioning of nuclear plants in the US. Price 
plummeted at $10/lb, a level at which it stayed until the early 2000s. Figure 3 shows the 
evolution in the production of uranium after the 2
nd
 world war to our days, and the 
fluctuations in prices, linking those to key political and industry events.  
 
                                               
1
 Most of these mines have not opened yet because the opening dates tend to be optimistic, however they give a good 
indication of future openings and where is the thrust of uranium mining development.  
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2nd BOOM: oil crisis, 
uranium cartel, 
increasing demand, 
changes in market
3rd BOOM 2000’
Price increase due to:
-Perceived diminishing
secondary resources
- Increase in demand
- Speculative markets
- Mine accidents
1970 US stops 
buying uranium
awaiting for civil 
nuclear program
Stockpile of uranium
too great
1959 US stops buying
uranium abroad. 
Canada’s production
greatly affected
1st BOOM
Cold War: 
Increased
production
80’ Production
sustained due to
long term
enrichment
contracts
1979 BUST:
Three Mile 
Island Accident
 
Figure 3. Evolution of uranium price. Price sources: 48-68 US/AEC, 69-86 Nuexco EV, 87-Present Ux 
U3O8 Price. Info provided by The Ux Consulting Company, LLC. History sources: Amundson (2002), 
Combs (2010), Radeztki (1981) 
 
The uranium market works on the basis of bilaterally negotiated contracts between 
uranium producers and buyers, i.e. nuclear utilities, with a number of intermediaries 
including traders and hedge funds. The vast majority of contracts are transacted under 
long-term, typically 3-15 year contracts directly between a mine and a nuclear plant 
(WNA, 2010). The remaining are traded through “spot” trade (up to 12 month delivery) 
that accounts for less than 20% of supply (WNA, 2010). Two features are important: 
first, since it takes considerable time to expand production at existing mines or through 
development of new mines, price can increase for an extended period of time before 
production can grow to satisfy demand. Vice versa, the long-term nature of contracts 
means that production may continue at some level, even as prices fall, i.e. there is a time 
lag between price and production, though price and prospecting are more closely 
correlated. The cost structure of nuclear power generation, with high capital and low 
fuel costs, means that once power generators are in place, demand is relatively 
predictable, more so than for other mineral commodities. 
 
In the 2000s, uranium followed other commodities with a spectacular rise up until the 
economic crisis of 2007/08, from just $7 a pound in 2003 to $140 by 2007 (see figure 
3). This was provoked partly by two mine accidents lowering production, the entry in 
the market of hedge and investment funds and the growing perception of diminishing 
secondary resources with the end in 2013 of the „megatons for megawatts‟ program 
between Russia and the US, whereby the US supplies 50% of its requirements buying 
miliatary stockpiles from Russia. This was reinforced by the 2007 edition of the “Red 
Book”, the authoritative publication of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency since the 1960s about uranium supply and 
demand, “given the long lead time typically required to bring new resources into 
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production, uranium supply shortfalls could develop if production facilities are not 
implemented in a timely manner.” (OECD, 2007). However, after a spectacular rise, the 
price felt down to $40-50 and was on a recovering path (reaching $70) when it fell 
again to $55 after the Fukushima events (UxC, 2011). It is still at a very high level 
compared to its early 2000 levels. Despite the high costs of nuclear power in a context 
of stressed public finance, the reduction of electricity demand in countries hit by the 
crisis, and the Fukushima events, analysts maintain that in the longer-term, and by 2020, 
there remains an important imbalance (of approximately 80 million pounds) between 
supply and demand that requires new mines and high prices to incentivise such a mining 
expansion (RBC Capital Market, 2012).  
 
3. The effects of the global uranium rush in Namibia 
 
3.1 Namibia’s uranium rush 
 
Why a uranium rush in Namibia? Namibia has considerable reserves, some 284,000tn, 
about enough to supply 4 years of the world‟s demand at 2010 levels, but they are of 
low-concentration and therefore expensive. Namibia‟s attractiveness is a function of 
geographical, political and social factors. Namibia is a vast country, the second least 
sparsely populated in the world; 2.1 million people share 824,292 sq km. Most of 
central and south Namibia is suitable only for cattle herding or small-scale horticulture 
and is inhabited by scattered, small ethnic tribes. It is in central Namibia, in the Erongo 
region that uranium prospecting concentrates (see map 1). The lack of population 
relaxes health concerns and possible resistance that can delay works. Land is cheap and 
water scarcity means less risk of water contamination.  
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Map 1. Map of Namibia with the 66 exclusive prospective licenses (blue boxes in the map). 
 
Namibia offers a good and stable “business environment”. The World Bank praises 
Namibia as a “success case” with GDP growth of 4.5 percent per year since 1990 and a 
middle-class income profile (GDP per capita of US$ 3,614, BoN, 2008). Politically 
Namibia is stable, governed since independence from the South African apartheid 
regime in 1990 by the liberation party, South West Africa People‟s Organisation 
(SWAPO), which has won all five free parliamentary elections. SWAPO quickly 
abandoned plans for the nationalization of foreign corporations, opting for market-
oriented policies and an investor-friendly tax regime, better than even that of 
neighbouring South Africa (Rakner, 2001). Resource rent collection is poor when 
compared even to other African nations; Botswana captured 76% compared to 
Namibia‟s 42% between 1980 and 1997 (Lange, 2003). The royalty for uranium is 
currently set at 3% of revenue
2
, a relatively low rate by international standards (MME, 
2010). Companies can apply for deferment or reduction of royalty payment; as a result 
uranium royalties account for only 0.08% of total government revenue in 2008 (US$2.5 
m compared to the desired US$43.7 m; MME, 2010)
3
. The corporate tax rate for mining 
is 37.5% of profits, but several exemptions are often taken advantage by corporations 
(MME, 2010), including “Export Processing Zones”, such as the one offered to Areva‟s 
Trekkopje uranium mine, free from corporate, import or sales taxes, in exchange for 
“technology transfer, capital inflow, skills development and job creation” (sic) (MME, 
2010: 7-109). 
 
Attractive for investors is also the lack of restrictive environmental regulation. Even if 
better than in some other African countries, regulation in Namibia is definitely not in 
par with the magnitude of the uranium rush (MME, 2010). Apart from a binding 
constitutional clause for ecosystem maintenance, the only other concrete body of Law is 
the – under revision – 1992 Minerals Act which asks for a “lite” Environmental Impact 
Analysis, and lacks important provisions such as mining closure and rehabilitation 
requirements
4
. An Act with requirements for an EIA applicable to all mining projects 
has been approved since 2007 but so far has not been implemented. Implementation of 
law is hampered by a weak administration; indicatively in the Ministry of Environment, 
there is only one person in charge of revising all EIAs for the whole country 
(Interview#138); in the Ministry of Water only five people monitor the water quality of 
all 13 regions of the country. Approved uranium mining EIAs have been widely 
criticised by local and international NGOs (Schmidt and Diehl, 2005; wise uranium, 
2011; Interview#1). Environmental management is largely left to voluntary industry 
self-regulation (such as ISO and corporate responsibility standards) or to the Namibian 
Chamber of Mines program that is no legally binding and is not independently 
monitored.   
 
Corruption in Namibia is low (61
st
 out of 180 countries in the global Corruption 
Perception Index
5
), however according to the Afrobarometer (2008), 49% of 
                                               
2
 Except for Rössing Uranium, for which is levied at 6%. 
3
 In 2004, the government decreed a 5 percent royalty on all non-diamond mining companies, but the mining lobby 
challenged this as illegal based on a clause of the Mining Act 1992 that higher levies could be enforced only on a case 
to case basis (Sherbourne, 2009). 
4
  Closure provisions are to be included the revised Act, though they are likely to remain voluntary. 
5
 http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008  
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respondents inside Namibia felt officials were corrupt. Critics (Melber, 2003; Bauer, 
2001) contend that there is an emerging, black elite based around SWAPO‟s control of 
the growing public sector, which gives work to 22% of the employed population, and 
spends more than 30% of GDP (Sherbourne, 2009) channeling public funds to 
privileged interests in defense, paramilitary security and intelligence (Mbai & 
Sherbourne 2004 cited by Melber, 2007). Mineral exploration licenses are protected by 
a “secrecy clause” in the 1992 Minerals Act and the Minister has much leverage for the 
terms of agreement with foreign corporations, with no public oversee (IPPR, 2010).  
 
Namibia is 94th out of 129 countries in the UNESCO‟s Education for All Development 
Index partly reflecting the legacy of a two-tiered apartheid education system (Cohen, 
1993). Moreover, spending in crucial sectors like health and education has declined 
since the mid 1990s (Sherbourne, 2009).  The Human Development Index is at 105th 
(out of 169 countries), 50% of the population were unemployed in 2008 (NFLS, 2009), 
with two thirds of Namibians living in rural areas and half of them relying on 
subsistence agriculture (Sherbourne, 2009). 27.6 % of the population are considered to 
live in poor conditions (NPC, 2008) and due to HIV/AIDS life expectancy has reduced 
to 51.2 years (OECD, 2008). Namibia‟s inequality is amongst the highest in the world, 
with a Gini coefficient of income distribution 0.73. The government maintains a focus 
on overall economic growth to address such social problems with mining at the 
forefront. Mining (diamonds and other minerals too) produced 10% of economic output 
in 2009 compared to 17% by tourism (NTB, 2008). However mining is responsible for 
43.7% of export earnings (BoN, 2010) and uranium alone could in theory add 3-9% of 
total government revenue by 2015 (MME, 2010). There is much lip-service paid to 
mining as a source of employment, but the sector employs only 7,563 workers (0.02% 
of the employed population) (Sherbourne, 2009), ten times less than tourism (NTB, 
2008). 
 
Namibia has a relatively good – for African standards – infrastructure that facilitates 
material export with the mines connected to port facilities (map 2). However, isolation, 
aridity, and the use of water-intensive techniques to extract the low-quality ore, require 
new water supply for the mines and the government is in search for funds for a new 
desalination plant. Namibia‟s bulk water supplier provided in 2008 67Mm3 of water 
(The Namibian, 7 July 2008), yet seven new mines will require 30Mm
3
 more by 2015 
(Chamber of Mines, 2009a). Mining stresses also the electricity system which faces 
periodic power shortages due to its dependency on South Africa (Sherbourne, 2009). 
Energy demand by uranium mining alone may reach 150MW by 2015
 
compared to 
564MW in 2010; a 25MW emergency diesel generator is currently constructed, with 
plans for a coal-fired power plant near the coast (NAMPOWER, 2010)
6
. The isolation 
of the uranium reserves means also that there is a shortage of local labour and a cost for 
the resettlement or transportation of workers that has to be born by the mine or the 
                                               
6 Other projects in the pipeline are a the Walvis Bay coal-fired power station (250-400MW), a 
complex project to exploit the offshore kudu gas reserve and a 951km power line connection 
with the Zambian grid that will require borrowing of up to US$129 million (Global Transmission, 
2009; Sherbourne, 2009; Nampower, 2010). Mining revenue therefore comes at a considerable 
cost for the public burse.  
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workers themselves. All these needs raise questions about the net monetary benefit of 
uranium mining for the public burse.  
Trekkopje
Swakopmund
Walvis Bay
Spitzkoppe
Valencia
Rössing
Arandis
Husab
Etango
Aussinanis
Langer Heinrich
Topnaar
Ida
Tubas
Oryx
Tumas
Marenica
Inca
S-Bend
Red Sands
Ripnes
50 km
Planned mines
Mines under construction
Operating mines
Towns and Communities Namib Naukluft National Park
 
Map 2. Map referencing main uranium mines in the area (operating, under construction and planned) and 
town and communities most affected by the uranium expansion. Source: Authors with Google Earth map 
and data from MME, 2010 and Reptile Uranium. 
 
In 2007 the government enacted a moratorium on new Exclusive Prospective Licenses 
(EPL) to allow environmental regulation and infrastructures to catch up. Nonetheless, at 
least 12 more mines are in the pipeline (map 2). In the remaining of this section we 
investigate the social responses, actual and potential, to the expansion of the uranium 
frontier. We start from Rössing, Namibia‟s first and the world‟s 3rd largest uranium, 
and next compare four diverse cases of prospective mines with different socio-
environmental settings.  
 
3.2. The Rio Tinto mine in Arandis  
 
The Rössing mine was founded by Rio Tinto in 1976. Rio Tinto is one of the biggest 
mining companies in the world with earnings of $1.19bn for its energy segment in 2010 
alone. Total production of uranium oxide from Rio Tinto‟s uranium mines in Australia 
and Namibia in 2010 was 16.6 million pounds (Rio Tinto, 2010). The Rössing mine is 
located in the middle of Erongo, 60km from the nearest town of Swakopmund (map 2).. 
Rio Tinto built Arandis at a stroke in the middle of the dessert to house workers. Most 
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came from far away, often without their families: in 1977 only 550 of the 1600 black 
workers were from the local Damara ethnicity, others coming from as far as South 
Africa or Malawi (Moody, 1992). After a long period of downscaled production, the 
mine in the last few years has pumped up again its production (from 2,000tn in 1993 to 
4,150tn in 2009; Chamber of Mines, 2009b). Furthermore, French AREVA built a new 
mine nearby Rössing and 3 to 4 new mines stand to open soon. How do locals perceive 
these developments? Our interviews suggest that many people in Arandis are 
welcoming this revival of mining activity. As interviewees indicatively stated uranium 
mining means “more money into the country” (interview#98), reopening “a bank 
branch, a hospital and a petrol station” and turning the town hopefully into “an 
industrial hub”(interview#16) with “permanent jobs” (interview#120).  
Such lack of reaction comes as a surprise, given Arandis‟ emblematic position 
internationally in social resistance against uranium mining (Hecht, 2010; Moody, 1992). 
The history of this resistance is worth to be recapped. The mine started during the 1970s 
global uranium boom, with a fixed contract between Rio Tinto and the British 
Government, which used uranium for military and civilian purposes (Avery Joyce, 
1978; Roberts, 1980). By the early 1980s, UK was importing nearly half its 
requirements from Rössing alone (Moody, 1991). The deal induced an international 
„Campaign Against the Namibian Uranium Contract‟ (CANUC), which brought 
together the Namibian independence movement, the anti-apartheid movement (the deal 
was in breach of UN decisions), and “Partizans” (People Against Rio Tinto Zinc and 
Subsidiaries), a London-based grassroots organization. The movement held a number of 
direct actions and demonstrations in the U.K., Germany and Japan mobilizing in the 
process students, anti-nuclear groups, campaigners for nuclear disarmament and trade 
unions. In 1984, the biggest contract between Rössing and a UK nuclear power plant 
wasn‟t renewed, partly due to weakening demand and partly due to the activist pressure. 
Flows of uranium from Namibia to the UK continued, even if in several occasions 
delayed and rerouted as during the strike of Liverpool dockworkers in February 1988, 
who refused handling 13 containers of uranium coming from Namibia (Dropkin and 
Clark, 1992).  
 
The international campaign highlighted the appalling living, wages and worker rights‟ 
conditions in Arandis (Dropkin and Clark, 1992; Roberts, 1980). Rössing‟s workers 
also mobilised and held continued strikes in 1976 and 1978 (Hetch, 2010; Moody, 
1992). The crackdown was fierce, as the Apartheid regime prohibited unionising and in 
1980 closed the main workers‟ Union of Namibia, imprisoning much of its leadership 
without trial. Still, the combination of local and international pressure partly paid off, as 
Rio Tinto in the early 1980s set up a special Foundation investing in improvements for 
the Arandis community. As one of the initial settlers recalls from those years: „We 
didn‟t have to pay for housing, water or electricity, everything was provided for us, we 
even had a social centre and sports facilities‟ (Interview#97). Still, in 1989 half of 
Rössing‟s workers lived in hostels without their families, while whites continued having 
the better jobs (Moody, 1992). In 1988, and with independence around the corner, 
workers formed Rössing‟s Mining Workers Union and fought to end racism in the 
workplace, extending this to safety and health demands (Hetch, 2010; interview#125). 
Hetch (2010) gives an excellent historical account of Rössing‟s workers‟ struggle for 
health rights and the micro-politics of science involved. Local struggles were linked to 
the international movement, which after Namibian independence gave priority to health 
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issues, with the publication in 1992 of „Past Exposure‟ (Dropkin and Clark, 1992), a 
report that denounced the high levels of radiation and pollution in the mine, 
documenting a huge seepage of 780m gallons of radioactive tailings prior to 1980. 
Rössing invited experts of the IAEA for inspection, who concluded that the mine had an 
„oustanding‟ track record and that radiation was well below limits (Hetch, 2010). The 
Union and the international campaign hired a black Namibian medical student working 
in Germany to conduct a health assessment of Rössing‟s workers, who concluded that 
miners had increased risks of genetic damage and a worrying reduction in testosterone 
levels (Zaire et al., 1996, 1997). Rio Tinto disputed his findings with two internationally 
recognised scientists who concluded that there was „no chromosoma aberration‟ (Lloyd 
et al., 2001). The campaign came at a peak and then receded in 1998, as an ex-
mineworker with cancer won the right to bring his US$650,000 compensation case in 
the UK, but the case was dismissed because it had expired (Meeran, 2011; Hetch, 
2010).  
 
What happened to this struggle? We hypothesize that the disappearance of resistance 
relates to the three factors mentioned in the introduction to this article; the “ecology” 
(natural and social) of Arandis, the deepening process of economic marginalization of 
the community and the weakening of the multi-scalar ties between workers and the 
international movement that mobilised resistance in the 1970s and up until the 1990s. 
First, the workers, settled in the middle of a dessert, have no alternative source of 
livelihood, than work in the mines. This dependence has intensified since the end of the 
1980s, following the bust of the global uranium market (section 2). Declining 
profitability strengthened Rio Tinto in its negotiations with SWAPO, which gave up its 
initial plans to nationalize the mine. Rio Tinto stayed but operating the mine in “sleep 
mode”, diverting money from a future restoration fund in order to pay the workers, and 
cutting down community expenses, handing the responsibility for the town back to the 
government in 1992. Almost 70% of the workforce was fired in the 1990s (Chamber of 
Mines, 2009b), making many people flee the town. Arandis lost many of its facilities, 
including the bank, the petrol station and the hospital, which was reduced to a clinic. 
Residents found themselves having to pay for services such as electricity, water, 
schooling and housing and the local authority was stripped of its revenue base, while 
facing increasing demands from an impoverished population (Interview #16). While 
marginalization deepened, the international movement against Rössing waned. Partizans 
shifted their limited resources to other fights against Rio Tinto, the anti-nuclear 
movement subsided with the retreat of nuclear energy in the 1990s, while pro-
independence groups had achieved their purpose. We might also speculate on a possible 
cooptation of the Union within SWAPO‟s and Rössing‟s paternalism.  
 
Presently Arandis houses some 4,500 people, Rössing remaining the largest and almost 
only formal employer providing work to 494 people in 2008. Six to eight people are 
dependent on each mineworker in Arandis (Hoadley et al., 2005). Although Rössing‟s 
salaries are relatively good for Namibia (they start from US$1,000/year), 88% of 
Rössing‟s mine workers in 2008 were subcontracted to companies that do not offer 
benefits or labour security. The revival of mining appears therefore as the only hope for 
the town‟s residents and its local authority. Yet the first signs of a renewed local-
international campaign may be found in the awareness activities since 2008 by Earthlife 
Namibia and the Labour Resources and Research Institute (LaRRI), which disseminate 
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interviews with sick Rössing‟s ex-workers who link their health problems to the mine7. 
The health impacts to workers are becoming more acute now, with many of the old 
workers becoming sick (interviews#96,98,99,109,110). Assessing the full-scale of such 
claims is nearly impossible, as many ex-workers die unregistered at their places of 
origin, whereas Rössing refuses to make public any data related to the health condition 
of its workers not only to us but also to the health authorities (Interview#11).  
 
5.3. Snapshots from Namibia’s current uranium rush  
 
Whereas the community of Arandis lived through the typical boom and bust cycle of the 
uranium industry, the four cases examined here have not had previous contact with 
uranium. 1. The Spitzkoppe community is located in the northern part of the Erongo 
region, 50 km from the site where Areva obtained a mining license in 2009 to build a 
mine (see map 2) and inside their conservancy area. 2. The Topnaar is a community that 
belongs to the Nama ethnic group, living along the Kuiseb river, where two Australian 
corporations, Reptile and Toro Uranium are undertaking exploration (see map 2: 
Aussinanis  and Ripnes). 3. In the Valencia farm area, five white land-owners have 
bought land as a second residence; this is the site of a new mine owned by the Canadian 
Forsys Metals. 4. Finally, Swakopmund is a coastal town with 29,000 inhabitants living 
from tourism where several mines are in the process of obtaining a license in the nearby 
National Park. Compared to Swakopmund, Spitzkoppe and Topnaar are much smaller 
communities with 1600 and around 1000 people each.  
 
Table 1 compares the four cases and Arandis. Differing levels of perception and 
reaction towards uranium mining are observed. In Spitzkoppe where we talked to 22 
people, nobody was aware what radiation means or the potential impacts of uranium 
mining. People were very enthusiastic with the arrival of mines, a woman commenting: 
„(The opening of the mine) it‟s my dream, our people must be given a job, training, we 
must change our living standards‟ (Interview#40). As the headman of the community 
states: „228 applications have been presented [to the mining company] and I think most 
of them will get a job‟8. Areva fuelled expectations of development by drilling a village 
borehole for potable water in 2008. „If they have power to bring us water, they can also 
develop the community‟, an interviewee told us enthusiastically (Interview#22).  
 
With the Topnaar the situation is different. While a large part of the community, 
especially elders, are ignorant of the nearby mining explorations, and their potential 
impacts, many expressing similar sentiments as in Spitzkoppe about jobs and 
development, a significant proportion of the population, particularly those more 
educated and further up in the hierarchy of the community are aware and concerned 
with impacts. Many expressed similar sentiments to this interviewee: “I don‟t mind the 
mines, but not here, not in the Kuiseb, they can be located there (points out), in the 
gravel plains, away from us‟ (Interview#69) because „they will impact on our grazing 
areas, they create too much dust and noise and the (wild) animals will go‟ 
                                               
7
 One of them, Petrus Haoeb, an ex-worker now out on disability, talked to us and is convinced that his bad health, 
including proven anemia, is related to radiation exposure in the early years of the mine (interview #98). 
8 However, the minimum education required to work in a uranium mine is Grade 12 and only a 
very small number of the people from Spitzkoppe reach that level.  
 
M. Conde & G. Kallis. Stewart: The Global Uranium Rush and its Africa Frontier. Lessons from Namibia 
 19 
 
 
 
Creative Commons License 2.5 
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 2.5 Generic 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
(Interviews#47 and 73). Others, complaining about the arrival of mines told us „I like 
our way of living, here is peace and quiet‟ (Interview#66). „I will never die of hunger 
here, I can kill a goat if I am hungry, there will always be something to eat‟ 
(Interview#63). The Topnaar community is the only community in Namibia that has 
expressed publicly its concern about the mining expansion; statements by their Chief 
Seth Kooitjie appeared in a national newspaper (New Era 13/11/2008). Yet, the Chief 
sounded more pragmatic to us than in public: „We have no power to stop the mines, 
nobody asks us, nobody has ever asked us permission for anything‟ but added that „at 
least they should give us something, we want jobs and development‟ (Interview#46).  
 
 
Table 1. Comparison of four cases and Arandis based on basic data of the mines and the communities 
near them, including economic, social and environmental characteristics as well as absence or not of 
conflict. Source: the authors based on interviews, mining companies‟ websites and Chamber of mines 
(2009b) 
 
In the city of Swakopmund in turn, there is awareness that the uranium mines are going 
to damage the tourism industry, either by the visual impact of the mines and the 
associated infrastructure, the blocking off routes and often visited places in the National 
Park, or the influx of migrant workers that could increase insecurity (Interview#144b) 
and the development of new industry supporting the mines in the city which will change 
its laid-back character (MME, 2010). The tourism industry is controlled by whites; 
although most of them realize the importance of conserving the park 
(Interviews#130,129,129b), few have ventured to voice their complaints outwardly and 
more hope for “sustainable”, mutually satisfactory solutions through the information 
sessions that are held with the mining companies. Few complaints have reached though 
national newspapers (The Namibian, 12 August 2010, 31  October 2008) and even made 
it to the international press (abc, 30 October 2010). Officials believe that mining and 
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tourism can co-exist (interview#142, 138), since many areas of visitors‟ interest will 
remain unaffected by the infrastructure; the same is the hope of the tourist operators.  
 
Interestingly, the only legal challenge to the national uranium rush comes from one of 
the handful of white land-owners holding a vacation home near Valencia Farm (see map 
2). These came here out of appreciation of nature and the beauty of wilderness. As one 
of them told us: “look at the view and see what it was like years ago; no paths, no 
telephone, we want to keep it like this for those after us” (Interview#157). They 
perceive that the mine “will have an impact not only on the water, but on the animals, 
on the air, on the landscape, (...) people will come to the area to work, it will stop being 
the way it is now”(Interview#157). The Valencia Farm owner negotiated with Forsys 
granting them access to his land (Interview#149), and only one challenged in court the 
groundwater permit that was given to the mine for its construction phase (Court Case, 
2008). The Supreme Court has now returned the case to the High Court allowing the 
plaintiff to put the case forward. In the meantime the water permit has been on hold; 
together with the fall in uranium prices, and the water shortage problem, this has slowed 
down the plans of Forsys for the area.  
 
How can we make sense of these differences in perception and reaction? Looking first 
at the spatial geographical context, all projects are located in the remote arid territory of 
Erongo, yet there are different degrees of conflict with alternative uses of the territory. 
Whereas the Spitzkoppe barely subsist and do not use extensively the local 
environment, the Topnaars rely on herding and the melons that grow on the riverbed, 
their survival intimately linked to the river. For Swakopmund, the mines are something 
happening far away, though it will impact visually a considerable part of the territory 
that provides them wealth through the tourism industry. These are still tentative links, 
and there is hope that given the vastness of the area, tourism can continue unimpeded 
avoiding the mines; more worrisome are the changes that might take place in the city 
itself given the possible influx of workers, but these are also uncertain and not 
immediate. In the Valencia farms, the conflict is more direct between the leisure use of 
the area by the rich white land-owners which is evidently incompatible with a mining 
operation of a radioactive substance. 
 
Secondly, each of these communities have different degrees of power to challenge 
mining development. The Spitzkoppe belongs to the Damara ethnic group who were 
used as slaves by the Nama and Herero for centuries and as a result did not experience 
the process of ethnic self-definition and coherence of other tribes (Henschel and 
Wenning, 2009). As part of German and South African colonial policies of 
dispossession, the Damara (as other tribes in Namibia) were disposed of their land 40 
years ago, which passed to whites for farming and they were confined to native reserves 
in marginal, semi-deserted lands (called the “Police zone”). Their community remains 
economically marginalised even by Namibian standards with an average annual income 
per person of US$150 - US$300 with more than 75% being unemployed or living by 
small-scale mining.  The literacy rate is considerably lower than the average for the 
region with more than 50% not completing primary education (Areva, 2008).  
 
Although education levels and incomes are low also in the Topnaar, the latter are a 
much more ethnically cohesive and politically empowered community with a strong 
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attachment to their land in the vicinity of the mouth of the Kuiseb River, where they‟ve 
lived for centuries. Although, the area was declared a Game Reserve in 1907 by the 
Germans and a National Park in 1979 by the South Africans, the Topnaar resisted 
repeated plans for their eviction and were eventually granted semi-permanent 
communal land tenure rights in 1979 and a recognition of their Traditional Authority 
with a legal Act in 2000 (Henschel and Wenning, 2009). In later years many Topnaars 
have emigrated succumbing to government harassment and in search of jobs to the 
coastal cities, but those who remain maintain a subsistence-based living relying on local 
resources and a strong communal structure, controlled hierarchically by the Chief and 
his family.  
 
The Valencia land-owners and the Swakopmund tourist operators live a world apart 
from the Topnaar and Spitzkoppe. They form part of the educated, wealthy white-elite 
of Namibia and this explains why the former have been the only who have successfully 
accessed the Courts and managed to stop, at least temporarily, a mine. The same reasons 
have allowed few tourist operators to access national and international press. However, 
during SWAPO rule, the position of whites in Namibian society has changed, and 
although most of the privileges have been maintained, and whites control a great part of 
land and the economy, many of them are also hesitant to confront unnecessarily the 
SWAPO government and its development plans, prefer to stay in their own turf. Partly, 
this might explain why in the case of Swakopmund, the tourist operators are less willing 
to challenge head on the mining plans and why they retain a more fatalistic, “wait and 
see” approach.  Similarly in Valencia court case, this might explain why the demand 
was put forward only by one land-owner only and others hesitated to join the legal 
process.  
 
Thirdly, links with external actors also influence the differing levels of reaction. While 
Spitzkoppe has remained largely isolated and people there have heard nothing about 
uranium or nuclear energy, awareness by the Topnaar owes a lot to a „tour‟ presentation 
in 2008 by two foreign environmentalists who gave several public talks on nuclear 
energy and uranium mining and showed dramatic pictures of health impacts of 
radioactivity elsewhere. Many of our interviewees remembered the presentation and 
although they did not fully comprehend the nature of the impacts, they understood that 
uranium mining would pose a health threat and decided to oppose it. In the Valencia 
case also, the success of the plaintiff to reach the Supreme and High Court would not 
have been possible without the collaboration with the Legal Assistance Centre, an 
independent legal NGO based in the capital, and which takes on legal challenges against 
human rights abuses.  
 
If we were to predict the prospects of resistance, we would state that Namibia as a 
whole is a country of “least resistance”, given its geography and social structure, and 
this explains the ease with which the global uranium rush expands in the territory, 
driven away from more developed countries, with more and better reserves. Save for the 
Valencia farms, where a strong white individual with the help of an NGO managed to 
mount the only legal challenge to a uranium mine, the only other case where resistance 
may challenge the expansion of the frontier is the Topnaar, where the dependence of the 
community on local resources that stand to be impacted by uranium, suggests for a 
potential “environmentalism of the poor”. Internal community power dynamics will be 
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important in the Topnaar case. Some Topnaars questioned to us the honesty of the chief, 
claiming that he „is in favour of the mines because he receives money from them‟ given 
that he let the companies drill for prospecting (Interviews #77,78,84 and 85). Moreover 
the Chief‟s rule is disputed by contender King Khaxab, who opposes the mine 
expansion. In the Swakopmund case, not much resistance should be expected, though 
given the importance of the tourist economy, we can speculate that if the first mining 
activities in the Park start having an impact on the sector, this might slow down 
subsequent ones. Another limiting factor for the expansion of the uranium frontier in 
Namibia is the sheer amount of infrastructure, especially for water, that needs to be 
mobilised, the cost of which is prohibitive for most private operators, and difficult for 
the State to take up. The financial crisis, the Fukushima event, coupled with the 
declining prices of uranium, may do more to halt the uranium frontier, than local 
resistance, though the two may at some point coalesce, making some investments too 
expensive to undertake.     
 
4. Conclusions  
 
The world‟s growing social metabolism is producing new geographies of extraction and 
resistance in different parts of the world. This article investigated the expansive 
geographies of a vital energy resource for powering modern society, uranium, and the 
forms of resistance it meets in a specific territory, Namibia. Our task was both empirical 
and theoretical: empirical in terms of collecting information about the expansion trends 
of the uranium mining industry and in documenting the forms and consequences of this 
expansion in a specific place, Namibia; theoretical in terms of formalizing and using 
accumulated knowledge from previous political ecological studies to understand the 
conditions under which resistance is likely to emerge to this expanding frontier, the 
forms it can take and the ways in turn that it may shape the frontier and the territory.  
 
It is through the dialectics of expansion and resistance that the new uranium landscape, 
in Namibia and the rest of the world, will be determined. Local communities 
increasingly challenge corporate and government projects. In 2006, the Navajo hosted 
the first Indigenous World Uranium Summit with indigenous delegates participating 
from various parts of the world, calling for a ban of uranium mining in native territories. 
It is in fact a coalition of anti-mining, anti-nuclear and indigenous movements in North 
America and Australia, coevolving with a strengthening environmental regulation, that 
has resulted in delays of uranium mining projects, sending corporations to Africa in the 
search of a deregulated “El Dorado”. Given its geographical, socio-economic and 
governance conditions, Namibia offers itself as a path of least resistance and one may 
expect it to be at the tip of the expanding global uranium frontier.  
 
This is however no pre-determined trajectory. The recent nuclear disaster in Fukushima 
changes once again the dynamics of the nuclear industry, and by extension its 
commodity “tail”, uranium mining. Even if the effect on uranium production expansion 
and prices is not to be as dramatic as in the preceding Chernobyl and Three Mile Island 
incidents, given the inexorable increase of electricity demand in Asia, still the uranium 
rush is likely to slow down, and the most expensive, more problematic, or more 
resisted, projects are likely to be trimmed off. An important related development is the 
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reawakening of the anti-nuclear movement and the strengthening organizing between 
movements along the uranium chain. An expression of this is the recently created 
African Uranium Alliance, which brings together several NGOs working locally, part of 
which are Earthlife and LaRRI, which staged the renewed campaign against Rössing 
and the impacts of uranium mining on the health of workers. The Uranium Alliance is 
reinvigorating alliances with anti-mining movements elsewhere as well as nuclear 
energy campaigners like the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. 
It remains to be seen while the, largely middle-class and environmentally-minded 
mobilization will build effective bridges with marginalized workers, tribal communities 
at the local level, and the growing indigenous movement, to challenge the industry and 
re-shape the uranium frontier.   
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